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Since the suggestion of Justice Story in the Dartmouth Col-
lege case the States, in granting special charters of incorpora-
tion, have very generally reserved the right to alter and amend
or have asserted it in their general laws of incorporation. But
such a doctrine is utterly destructive of all property rights.
Hence the more conservative view has been generally adopted
that in this respect the States are left in the situation in which
they were before the Dartmouth College case, before it was de-
cided that private' charters are contracts within the Constitu-
tional provision against their impairment. But for this Consti-
tutional provision the power of the State to amend would exist
with no reservation in the charter. Hence the question is now
whether such an amendment or alteration by the State is within
the reservation or not. If it is, the further question as to
impairment of the charter contract must be decided; but if not,
no such question arises, as for this reason alone the amendment
must fail.
The last legislature of Indiana enacted as an amendment to
the general law for the incorporation of street railways (a section
of the law expressly reserving this right of amendment) that in
cities having a population of roo, ooo or more, according to the
U. S. census of 189o, the cash fare should not exceed three cents
for each trip. Another section gave the directors power to
make by-laws regulating the fare on their roads. In passing on
the validity of this amendment the Supreme Court of Indiana
and the U. S. Circuit Court came to directly opposite conclu-
sions. In City of Indianapolis v. Navin, 47 N. E. Rep. 525, the
former upheld its validity solely under the general police power
of the State as to regulation of rates, which power they declare
would exist even if the right to amend had not been reserved
and the exercise of which here does not impair the obligation of
any valid contract of either the State or the city. But can this
police power be so exercised as to conflict with the provisions of
the charter contract? Every amendment must come within the
reservation or the charter is violated. And squarely on this
point the two courts split. The Indiana Constitution prohibits
special laws except in certain specified cases, which do not in-
clude this, and in all others where a general law can be made
applicable, further providing that corporations other than bank-
ing may be formed under general laws. The Indiana court de-
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clares that whether a general law can or cannot be made applic-
able is a question exclusively for the legislature and not re-
viewable by the courts, and even if this were a local law which
they do not decide) it is not special, because it applies alike to
all roads now or hereafter operated in that locality. Some
weeks later the Circuit Court in Central Trust Co. v. Citizens'
Street Ry. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. i, after justifying its disregard of
the decision of the State court as final, on the ground that the
controversy concerned a contract whose meaning depended on
the construction of a statute, which constructibn was made
after the contract was entered into, held to the contrary. Its
argument was that the contract provision in its charter that the
directors may fix the rates cannot be altered by the Legislature
unless power so to do is reseaved by the charter (Reagan v.
Trust Co.. 154 U. S. 362), and the action of the Legislature must
come within this reservation. The Legislature has no general
authority under which it can change this corporate power with
regard to rates in contravention to the charter contract. The
power to regulate rates in distinction to the power to pass laws
making for the public health and morals can be contracted away
by the States. Further the amendment is special and local, as it
applies only to the one city of Indianapolis, and can never apply to
any other now or hereafter. Hence the law of incorporation
so amended becomes special and contrary to the Constitution.
The latter opinion seems to us to be based upon the sounder
reasoning. The Indiana court clears the subject of constitu-
tional objections by placing its decision on the police power of
the State. But in the matter of regulating rates the police
power cannot be exercised so as to violate any charter or con-
tract previously existing or constitutional provision (2 Mor. Pin.
Corp., Sec. 1075). If the amendment had not made the general
law of incorporation special, it must have stood.
All persons who have invented or evolved any machine or
process of manufacture, whether patentable or not, are entitled
to have their property in such invention protected from infringe-
ment. When any article is made under such conditions and
placed on general §ale, the public have a right, by any legiti-
mate means within their power, to ascertain the method of
manufacture, and to apply such knowledge to their own benefit.
But under such a right an employee of a.firm producing such
articles may not disclose the knowledge he has acquired in his
work, whether he has signed an agreement to refrain from so
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doing or not. The case of 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72
N. W. Rep. r40, is of value in drawing the above conclusions.
The defendant had been employed in the manufacture, by a
secret process, of sticky fly-paper; and, after leaving their em-
ploy, expressed his intention of disclosing to others, desirous of
entering into competition with the plaintiff, such knowledge of
the process involved as he had acquired; whereupon an injunc-
tion was asked for. The fact that a person has a right in any
secret process, though unpatented, which a court of equity will
respect, is well settled by numerous decisions, notably Peabody
v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452. Having such a right he can make and
enforce a contract with an employee against the disclosure of
any knowledge acquired in such business. One of the best
cases where such a contract existed, was that of Kodak Co. v.
Reichenbach, 79 Hun. 183, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1143, which was cited
in Little v. Gallus, 38 N. Y. Supp. 487. This latter case was
very similar in principle to the one under discussion, there be-
ing no express contract. The claim brought forward that such
contracts are in restraint of trade is of little importance. It has
been repeatedly held that contracts for the exclusive use of a
secret art are not in restraint of trade, and hence if one can
agree with another to refrain from using a secret process most
certainly an employer may so contract with his employee.
A case not reported as yet, but found in the Albany Law
journal for October 6, is In're Arthur L. Weeks. This case
arose upon a demand by a State court upon an Internal Revenue
Collector, whose headquarters were in an adjoining State,
where certain revenue papers were on public file, for informa-
tion contained therein. Upon his refusal to disobey the orders
of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Departments, forbidding
such testimony, he was committed for contempt, and petitioned
for a release on habeas corpus. On the hearing'the petition was
granted, and the case was declared similar to In re Huttozan, 70
Fed. Rep. 699, and distinguished from In re Hirsch, reported in
74 Fed. Rep. 928, and commented on in the February number of
this JOURNAL. The jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts
in In re Hirsch was held concurrent, while in the case at bar,
upon the principle set forth in In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, the
State court had no control over papers filed in another State.
The State, instead of attempting to compel the collector to tes-
tify, should have obtained the information necessary from the
papers themselves, which were open to public inspection.
